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Use of Trusted Software Modules for  
High Integrity Data Display 
Timothy E. Levin, Thuy D. Nguyen, Paul C. Clark, Cynthia E. Irvine,  
David J. Shifflett and Timothy M. Vidas 
 
 
This document describes an on-going research effort of the SecureCore project.[4]  The intended 
audience is the SecureCore research team whose members are familiar with the SP hardware [5] 
and SecureCore software architecture [1]. 
Introduction 
High assurance computer systems provide a trusted path for users to securely interact with the 
trusted computing base (TCB), including a keyboard for user input and a display device for the 
TCB to output information to the user. The TCB may also provide interfaces for other programs 
to write to an attached display device such that there is high assurance that data written to the 
device is displayed to the user without modification.  Usually this assurance is established 
through the program’s direct access to a securely designed interface, along with the ability of the 
TCB to protect itself. 
Despite these capabilities, there is no guarantee that high integrity information is written to the 
screen by untrusted applications supported by untrusted operating systems. During emergencies, 
there may be a need for applications, which do not have direct access to the TCB interface, to 
write to the screen with high assurance that the data is displayed to the user. The SP trusted 
software module (TSM) provides a context for high integrity code execution in the application 
domain, but requires support for a trusted display.  This document describes an architecture that 
supports a high integrity conduit between an application-level TSM and a high integrity display. 
Before describing the design of this capability, this report briefly reviews the SecureCore 
architecture, including the management of devices and communication channels. 
SecureCore Overview 
In the SecureCore security architecture, a trusted software module (TSM) hosted by an untrusted 
commercial operating system may communicate with a remote central authority (the Authority) 
through a channel that is encrypted with the SP [5] hardware-based Device Root Key (DRK). [6]  
Using a mechanism described in this paper, the TSM can communicate directly with the TCB – 
the Trusted Management Layer (TML) – ensuring that data from the TSM is displayed to the 
user, without potential interference by the commercial OS. 
The TML is composed of the Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) [7][9] and the Secure 
Core Security Services (SCSS) layer.  The TML provides a processing environment in which a 
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separate OS in each partition can manage its own applications without interference from other 
partitions. In this environment there are three types of partitions: trusted, emergency, and normal. 
The TML provides a high integrity display mechanism that is available to both applications 
hosted by untrusted operating systems in untrusted partitions and applications hosted by the 
SecureCore Operating System (SCOS) in the trusted partition.  This mechanism ensures that 
information can be displayed to the user with high integrity, without requiring the user to 
explicitly change the focus (see below) of the system to the trusted partition.   The TML manages 
small, high integrity display areas such that critical messages from different applications can be 
seen simultaneously by the user.  The limited screen area allocated for these critical messages as 
well as the simple mechanisms required in high assurance TCB development result in the 
requirement that each message must be short and non-graphical.  
 
Management of Devices and Communication Channels  
The TML provides synchronous and asynchronous device I/O interfaces and services. Device 
management is characterized in three ways.  First, certain devices may be virtualized by the 
TML. In this case, the TML presents the OSes with a virtual hardware device, such that 
undesirable interference between partitions is prevented, while the client operating systems and 
SCOS may simultaneously share the services of the actual underlying device.  
Second, a device may be assigned solely to a particular partition. For example, memory-mapped 
devices may be used so that they interact with processes through dedicated memory regions. 
Here device management is vectored by the LPSK to the client OS for its exclusive use. 
Finally, the SCSS supports focus management by allowing a particular partition temporary 
exclusive use of a device until the user, via the TPA, chooses to associate the device with a 
different partition. The keyboard, mouse, and screen require focus management. While keyboard 
and mouse input is vectored to the selected partition, all partitions continue to update their screen 
buffers. The system supports configurations with tiled windowing, so that output from partitions 
with sensitivity levels dominated by the user’s current session level can be simultaneously 
displayed.  For partitions that write to the display at a level higher than the current session level, 
the SCSS will maintain their screen output until the user establishes a session at a high enough 
level. Thus, instead of having to shut down activity at a particular session level to make the 
device available at a different level, e.g. [2][3], all partitions can continue to execute according to 
the predefined schedule.  
The TML divides the physical display screen into two regions. One region is reserved by the 
TML as a high-integrity display area, for example, for critical system messages. The other region 
is available to partition applications, as normal.  
Each exported device has two labels associated with it: a read-class and a write class. [8]   A 
device where both labels are equal is a single-level device; a device for which the two labels are 
different is a multilevel device. For single-level devices, the SCSS exports an interface for 
administrative change of the device level during runtime, thereafter restricting access to the 
device to that security level. A multilevel device may be assigned to an untrusted partition by the 
SCSS, which then labels all of its I/O at the level of the partition. Finally, a multilevel device can 
be used by a trusted application, which is trusted to apply the right labels to its data.   
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The secure attention key (SAK), which is currently a keystroke sequence, allows users to invoke 
the Trusted Path Application (TPA). The LPSK services the SAK interrupt and passes control to 
the SCSS, which manages the focus change to the Trusted Path Application in the trusted 
partition.  
The SCSS is responsible for establishing trusted communication channels between the device 
and the central authority or trusted third parties.  It detects and verifies emergency signals from 
the central authority, restricts or allows access to the emergency partition accordingly, and raises 
or lowers alarms to other programs within the device, as configured to do so. 
Partitions may host network-capable client operating systems. The TML multiplexes 
communications among its partitions and to external nodes while ensuring enforcement of the 
system’s information flow policy. It associates implicit or explicit labels with information as 
needed. It also provides support for the establishment of secure communication channels, e.g. 
VPNs, with external nodes. For example, since network communication protocols are 
bidirectional, in a partition-to-partition communication channel, both partitions must be the same 
sensitivity level.  
High Integrity Display of Data 
The Trusted Application Display mechanism allows an application TSM or the TPA to send data 
directly to a reserved region of the display device. Figure 1 illustrates how this would be 
organized in an untrusted partition, in this case, the Emergency Partition. 
In the case of the TSM, the text for display may be encrypted, e.g., if it has come from the 
Authority.  Figure 1 shows this information stored in buffer 1.The TSM decrypts the data using 
SP-protected keys, and then stores the clear text in SP-protected memory using SP Secure_Store 
instructions, to prevent other applications from viewing or modifying it. The application TSM 
then invokes a TML TSM module, through a TML call gate.  The TML TSM reads the clear text 
using SP Secure_Load and then uses regular store instructions to write the data to a TML buffer 
(buffer 2). The TML TSM then exits CEM mode and invokes the TML’s Trusted Screen 
Handler, which sends the data to the Trusted Screen Driver for display in the restricted display 
region, labeling the data as appropriate. Finally, the TML TSM code re-enters CEM mode and 
returns execution control to the application-TSM, with a return value or similar mechanism 
indicating the success or failure of the display operation.  As the data traverses through different 
software components, its integrity is protected by SP hardware mechanisms and the TML. 
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Summary 
This report presents a high level design of a trusted display capability that utilizes both hardware 
and software protection mechanisms to preserve data integrity.  This capability affords users a 
high level of confidence that the data seen on the display device has not been tampered with by 






Figure 1. Trusted Application Display 
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